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A DISSENTING VIEW OF ASAHI METAL
INDUSTRY CO., LTD. V. SUPERIOR
COURT
GREGORY GELFAND*
There is a strong emotional appeal in the words "fair
play," "justice," and "reasonableness." But they were not cho-
sen by those who wrote the original Constitution or the Four-
teenth Amendment as a measuring rod for this Court to use in
invalidating State or Federal laws passed by elected legislative
representatives. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 325 (1945) (Black, J., concurring in result only).
I. INTRODUCTION
Mr. Justice Black, concurring in result only in Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington,1 criticized the majority's crea-
tion from thin air of a due process-based test for personal juris-
diction and predicted that the "minimum contacts" analysis
would produce an entirely ad hoc jurisprudence.2 In his view,
every imaginable fact pattern would have to be decided, as a
matter of constitutional magnitude, by the Supreme Court be-
cause the Court's notions of "fair play and substantial justice"3
would necessarily vary with the nuances of each case. With the
possible exception of his concurrence in Epperson v. Arkansas,4
* B.A., 1973, the State University of New York at Stonybrook; J.D., 1976, the Uni-
versity of Michigan Visiting Associate Professor, The University of Pittsburgh Law
School; Associate Professor, Widener University Law School. I would like to thank Neda
Biggs for her diligent work as my research assistant and Mary Ellen Roberts for typing
the preliminary drafts of this Article. Variations from A Uniform System of Citation
were made at the author's request.
1. 326 U.S. 310, 322-26 (1945) (Black, J., concurring).
2. See id. at 326; ("[A]pplication of this natural law concept, whether under the
terms 'reasonableness,' 'justice,' or 'fair play,' makes judges the supreme arbiters of the
country's laws and practices."); see also id. at 323, 325.
3. Id. at 324 (Black, J., citing the majority in International Shoe, id. at 316; quoting
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
4. 393 U.S. 97, 109-14 (1968) (Black, J., concurring). For my argument that Black's
873
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Black's opinion in Shoe has proven to be his most profound and
prophetic.
No case demonstrates the validity of Black's concerns more
than the Court's recent decision in Ashahi Metal Industry Co.,
Ltd. v. Superior Court.5 While Asahi is superficially a unani-
mous decision,' careful examination reveals a profoundly divided
Court applying analyses that contradict even the Court's recent
decisions and that do not appear to be based on sound policy
considerations. Because of these difficulties, the Asahi decision
appears to have achieved little more than the resolution of the
actual and highly unusua 7 fact pattern before the Court, raising
more troubling questions for future cases than it resolved. The
most encouraging aspect of the Ashahi decision may be the
knowledge that, since it reflects an entirely ad hoc jurispru-
dence, future decisions in the area of personal jurisdiction will
likely be inconsistent with it.
II. BACKGROUND
Asahi reached the Supreme Court as the remnant of a prod-
ucts liability suit filed in a California state court' against a num-
ber of defendants. The plaintiff claimed that a motorcycle acci-
dent in which he was injured and his wife was killed was caused
by a sudden loss of air pressure in the rear tire of his motorcy-
cle.9 The plaintiff alleged that the tire, tube, and sealant were
defective. Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial Company (Cheng
Shin), the Taiwanese manufacturer of the tube, filed a cross-
concurrence in Epperson presents the ideal solution to and predicts the ongoing evolu-
tion-creation controversy in the public schools, see Gelfand, Of Monkeys and Men-An
Atheist's Heretical View of the Constitutionality of Teaching the Disproof of a Religion
in the Public Schools, 16 J. L. & EDuc. 271 (1987).
5. - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987).
6. Only Part I of the opinion, merely stating the facts and the result, received all
nine votes. Compare infra notes 24-36 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 80 and accompanying text, with regard to the settlement of all of
the principal claims in the action, leaving only an ancillary claim pending before the
Court.
8. Since the action arose in state court, the Supreme Court, lacking general supervi-
sory powers over the matter, would only have had power to rule on constitutional
grounds. This made a forum non conveniens finding more difficult to justify than if the
claim had been filed in federal court.
9. 107 S. Ct. at 1029.
874 [Vol. 39
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claim against various codefendants,10 including Asahi Metal In-
dustry Company, (Asahi), the Japanese manufacturer of the
tube's valve assembly. Eventually, as the litigation proceeded,
plaintiff's claims and various other claims were settled and dis-
missed. As the result of these settlements, Cheng Shin's indem-
nification cross-claim against Asahi was the only remaining
claim.
Asahi objected to personal jurisdiction. The California Su-
preme Court, however, concluded that the trial court's exercise
of jurisdiction was proper." The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari.
12
Asahi had continuous and very substantial's contacts with
both the United States' 4 and California in terms of both general
10. See Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. Rptr. 741, 742 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1983).
11. Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 39 Cal.3d 35, 702 P.2d 543, 216 Cal.
Rptr. 385 (1985). The trial court denied Asahi's motion. California's Court of Appeal
issued the peremptory writ of mandate commanding the Superior Court of Solano
County to quash service of the summons on jurisdictional grounds. The Supreme Court
of California reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's ruling that
jurisdiction was proper.
12. - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 1258 (1986).
13. One factor completely missing from the Court's discussion is an analysis of
whether the contacts are specific or general. Specific contacts do not need to be continu-
ous. International Shoe actually suggested that they do. 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945). Later
cases, however, have made it clear that a single specific contact of the right nature and
quality is sufficient. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957);
Burt v. University of Nebraska, 757 F.2d 242 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 474 U.S. 1004
(1985), vacated, 475 U.S. 1063 (1986); Laxalt v. McClatchy, 622 F. Supp. 737, 743 (D.
Nev. 1985); Zerr v. Norwood, 250 F. Supp 1021 (D. Colo. 1966). The Court apparently
assumed that the specific contact between Asahi and California was insufficient because
the valve assembly at issue arrived in California indirectly. Such analysis embodies a test
only partially consistent with World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 285
(1980), in which the arrival of the car in the southwest United States was not only indi-
rect, but entirely fortuitous and completely in the plaintiff's control.
In addition, the Court has never discussed the possibility of a hybrid case in which
the specific contact is not quite sufficient, but when joined with existing general contacts
that are insufficiently continuous and systematic, form a combination of specific and
general contacts that may be sufficient. See, e.g., Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court,
71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969). Asahi would certainly seem to be
such a case.
14. The Court has never clarified in the international cases whether the relevant
contacts are with the particular state or with the entire American market. Because a
distant foreign defendant can defend in one state as easily as in another, it may be ar-
gued that the relevant criteria are the contacts with the United States as a whole. See,
e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1238-39 (6th Cir. 1981); Engineered
Sports Products v. Brunswick Corp., 362 F. Supp. 722, 728 (D. Utah 1973) ("Due Process
3
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and specific jurisdiction. 15 With regard to general contacts,
Asahi sold its tire valve assemblies to several tire manufacturers,
including Cheng Shin.1 A number of these companies sold their
tires, with Asahi valves, in the United States, resulting in a very
large volume of sales. Between 1978 and 1982 Asahi sold from
100,000 to 500,000 valve assemblies per year to Cheng Shin
alone. 7 No exact figures were before the Court regarding the
number of these valves (or the number of valves sold to other
manufacturers) that were ultimately sold in the United States or
California. An inspection of the tires in one motorcycle shop in
the California county where the suit was filed, however, showed
that Asahi's valves were present in substantial numbers.' Of ap-
proximately 115 tire tubes in the store, 97 were manufactured in
Japan or Taiwan; twenty-one of these (18.26%) had valve stems
made by Asahi. Twelve of the twenty-one Asahi valve assemblies
(57%) were on Cheng Shin tubes with the remainder incorpo-
rated into other manufacturers' tires. Further, Cheng Shin pro-
duced an affidavit of one of its purchasing managers stating that
he had told Asahi that Cheng Shin sold tubes throughout the
world and "specifically the United States.""' The record also
reveals that 20% of Cheng Shin's sales to the United States were
in California. 20 Asahi did not contest this fact, but rather coun-
tered with an affidavit of its president (who would have to have
been an expert in American law to be competent to testify on
this matter)2 stating that Asahi "has never contemplated that
or traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice should not immunize an alien
defendant from suit in the United States simply because each [individual] state makes
up only a fraction of the substantial nationwide market for the offending product.")
15. See supra note 13.
16. Sales to Cheng Shin accounted for 1.24% and 0.44% of Asahi's income in 1981
and 1982, respectively. - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1030 (1987). Therefore, it is quite
clear that Asahi was doing most of its business with other companies.
17. The number of Asahi valve assemblies sold, per year, to Cheng Shin were as
follows: 150,000 in 1978; 500,000 in 1979; 500,000 in 1980; 100,000 in 1981; and 100,000 in
1982. 107 S. Ct. at 1030.
13. An attorney for Cheng Shin made an informal examination of one cyclery in
Solano County and uncovered these findings in 1983. Because Asahi marks its valves
with an "A" in a circle, counsel was able to make an immediate identification. Since we
have no assurances that this was a truly random survey, we may assume that the Court
discounted these figures.
19. 107 S. Ct. at 1030.
20. Id.
21. Regarding admissibility, the opinion of someone unfamiliar with American juris-
876 [Vol. 39
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 4 [1988], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol39/iss4/5
19881 A DISSENTING VIEW 877
its limited sales of tire valves to Cheng Shin in Taiwan would
subject it to lawsuits in California. ' 22 Thus, Asahi sold a large
volume of valve assemblies annually to a number of companies
whose tires were sold with Asahi's knowledge throughout the
world and, particularly, in the United States. Even discounting
the figures produced by opposing counsel, tire tubes with Asahi
valves constituted a very significant portion of the stock contin-
uously sold in California motorcycle shops.23
With regard to Asahi's specific contacts, Asahi sold the
valve assembly in the tire that was involved in the California
accident. This valve assembly was sold to Cheng Shin who, as
Asahi had forewarning that it would, incorporated the valve into
a tube and shipped it for resale to a consumer in California.
III. THE Asahi OPINIONS
In evaluating the Asahi opinions, the first question concerns
which of the three opinions - and possibly which part or parts
of a given opinion - speak for a majority of the Court. Accord-
ingly, a brief overview of the opinions will precede detailed anal-
ysis of the specific points of contention. All nine justices felt
that jurisdiction was lacking. Yet Justice O'Connor's opinion for
the Court is probably less the product of majority support than
Justice Brennan's concurrence. O'Connor's opinion, in turn, is
broken down into Parts I, II-A, II-B, and III. Because only Parts
I and II-B have the support of a majority of the Court, each part
dictional concepts regarding whether American courts would apply jurisdiction appears
to be irrelevant. The Court has never applied a "man in the street" test for jurisdiction,
and it is unlikely that the man in the street would have views on such a subject.
22. 107 S. Ct. at 1030 (emphasis added). The crucial test of jurisdictional assertion
is at times said to be the foreseeability of being "haled into court." World-Wide Volk-
swagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 285, 297 (1980). This foreseeability analysis is absolutely
circular. Whether or not it is foreseeable that the defendant will be haled into court
depends entirely on what the Supreme Court decides. If the Court decides tomorrow
that certain circumstances justify jurisdiction, it suddenly becomes 100% foreseeable
that such a defendant will be haled into court in such cases. It is clear that the presi-
dent's affidavit was drafted by counsel who had World-Wide in mind. The fallacy of the
affidavit, however, shows the inadequacy of the explanation given in World-Wide.
23. If we assume that the percentage of the cyclery's Japanese or Taiwanese tire
tubes containing Asahi valve stems (18.26%; see supra text accompanying note 18) is
exaggerated, a more probable figure still might be 10%, which is a very significant por-
tion of the market. Asahi would have needed to argue that it had insufficient contacts
with a market in which its sales accounted for 10%, which seems astounding.
5
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of the O'Connor opinion must be treated separately.
Part I of O'Connor's opinion is simply a summary of the
facts of the case and its procedural development. It was joined
unanimously and it is difficult to imagine anyone (even counsel
for Cheng Shin) disagreeing with all but the last two words -
"we reverse." Following Part I, the fragmentation begins.
Part Il-A concluded that Asahi lacked the necessary con-
tacts with California. O'Connor argued that, even if Asahi was
aware that its valve assemblies would ultimately be sold in Cali-
fornia, California could not assert personal jurisdiction under
the "stream of commerce" doctrine. 4 O'Connor interpreted even
the stream of commerce doctrine as requiring that a defendant
purposefully direct its actions toward the forum state.2 5
O'Connor found that Asahi did not purposefully avail itself of
the privilege of exploiting the California market because it did
no business there directly and, more importantly, did not direct
or control the distribution system that brought its valves to Cal-
ifornia. To the extent that this portion of O'Connor's opinion
represents a major departure from accepted stream of commerce
analysis, it should be noted that this portion of her opinion gar-
nered only four votes; she was joined only by Rehnquist, Powell
(who is no longer on the Court), and Scalia. The five remaining
justices, speaking through either the concurrence opinion of
Brennan or Stevens, specifically rejected this portion of
O'Connor's analysis.
Part II-B of O'Connor's opinion held that even if the
threshhold minimum contacts existed, the Due Process Clause
2 6
did not allow California to assert personal jurisdiction be-
cause of an added fairness factor.2 7 O'Connor reached this con-
clusion because the burden on the foreign defendant was found
to be severe, as opposed to the minimal interests of Cheng
24. 107 S. Ct. at 1033.
25. For example, O'Connor stated: "[A] defendant's awareness that the stream of
commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum State does not convert the mere
act of placing the product into the stream into an act purposefully directed toward the
forum State." 107 S. Ct. at 1033.
26. See U. S. CONsT. amend. XIV. An identical restriction is probably binding on the
federal courts under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See U. S. CONST.
amend. V.
27. See 107 S. Ct. at 1033-35 (Part I-B).
[Vol. 39
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Shin28 and the forum state in adjudicating what had become, by
virtue of the settlement of the principal case, a contractual dis-
pute between two Asian trading partners. In addition, the inter-
national context of this matter was thought to warrant special
caution by the Court which stated at one point, "Great care and
reserve should be exercised when extending our notions of per-
sonal jurisdiction into the international field."129 Part II-B is par-
ticularly significant because all of the justices except Scalia
joined in it.30
Part III of O'Connor's opinion is a one sentence conclusion
that surprisingly rested the ultimate outcome of the opinion on
the minimum contacts analysis asserted in Part II-A, which gar-
nered only four votes, rather than the more broadly supported
reasoning of Part II-B.1 Accordingly, Part III, like Part II-A,
was joined only by Justices Rehnquist, Powell, and Scalia. Fur-
ther, O'Connor gave no reason for not including the fairness
analysis of Part II-B as a co-equal or alternate basis of the deci-
sion in this- one would have thought-improbable closing
sentence.
Justice Brennan's concurrence was joined by Justices White,
Marshall, and Blackmun, and differs only in degree from Justice
Stevens' concurrence (also joined by White and Blackmun, but
not Marshall). Both concurrences agreed with Part II-B of
O'Connor's opinion that jurisdiction in California would have
been unfair, but both concurring opinions argued that the un-
28. 107 S. Ct. at 1034. The Court seems to have dismissed Cheng Shin's interest in
this litigation by cavalierly assuming that, since plaintiff and defendant were both Asian
companies, the matter would be better adjudicated in an unspecified court in the Far
East.
29. 107 S. Ct. at 1035 (quoting United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378,
404 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
30. 107 S. Ct. at 1029. Since Justice Scalia joined Part II-A, and did not write to
explain his failure to join II-B, we are left with the unlikely assumption that he agreed
that Asahi lacked the basic contacts, but nonetheless did not feel that the assertion of
jurisdiction would have been unfair.
31. 107 S. Ct. at 1035. The entirety of Part III of O'Connor's opinion reads as
follows:
Because the facts of this case do not establish minimum contacts such that the
exercise of personal jurisdiction is consistent with fair play and substantial jus-
tice, the judgment of [the] Supreme Court of California is reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Part III presumably was separated into a distinct section from Part II-B solely because
those who joined Part II-B would not have been willing to support it.
1988]
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fairness argument should be the only reason for declining juris-
diction. The principal point of disagreement, then, was over Part
II-A of the O'Connor opinion, which concluded that Asahi
lacked the necessary contacts with California. At the core of this
disagreement are questions of the meaning and acceptance of
the stream of commerce argument. Brennan's concurrence re-
jected the O'Connor suggestion that the defendant must direct
or control the flow of its goods to purposefully avail itself of the
benefits of doing business in the forum. Brennan argued that
one who places goods into the general stream of commerce indi-
rectly benefits from the sales that ultimately result in the forum
state and that depend upon the forum state's laws that regulate
and facilitate commercial activity.32 Since Asahi made routine
and extensive sales to Cheng Shin and other manufacturers and
knew that they would sell the ultimate product in California,
Brennan would have found sufficient contacts to justify personal
jurisdiction over Asahi in that state.
Justice Stevens's concurrence rejected Part II-A for two rea-
sons that were not used by Brennan. First, Stevens found an ex-
amination of the contacts unnecessary since it had already been
determined that jurisdiction would not be permitted on the
ground of unfairness or unreasonableness. 3 Second, and more
importantly, Stevens superficially agreed with O'Connor's state-
ment of the "purposeful direction" version of the stream of com-
merce doctrine, but argued that O'Connor misapplied it to the
case.34 Stevens' reasons for concluding that the test was misap-
plied, however, actually amount to a differing concept of pur-
posefulness that more resembles Brennan's analysis than
O'Connor's reasoning. Stevens argued that an "unwavering line"
cannot be drawn between "mere awareness" that an item will
find its way into the forum state and "purposeful availment" of
that market through intermediaries. 35 Stevens, while purporting
to agree with O'Connor's test, nonetheless concluded:
32. 107 S.Ct. at 1035-36 (Brennan, J., concurring). Although the logic of Justice
Brennan's analysis does not require that Asahi have had knowledge of where its goods
were going, Brennan nonetheless indicated that such knowledge, albeit not control,
would be required. 107 S. Ct. at 1035. Compare infra notes 43-45 and accompanying
text.
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In most circumstances I would be inclined to conclude that a
regular course of dealing that results in deliveries of over
100,000 units annually over a period of several years would
constitute "purposeful availment" even though the item deliv-
ered to the forum state was a standard product marketed
throughout the world. 6
Stevens's view differs from Brennan's opinion in more than
semantics. Certainly Stevens would have imposed a slightly
higher standard, but his analysis was so much closer to Bren-
nan's as to render Brennan's concurrence the closest approxima-
tion of a majority opinion with regard to the stream of com-
merce argument, supported, in essence, by five votes. Combining
Part 11-B of O'Connor's opinion with Brennan's concurrence
gives the most accurate "majority" view possible of the Asahi
decision.
From this, or any other combination of the Asahi opinions,
however I respectfully dissent.
IV. THE STREAM OF COMMERCE DOCTRINE
Prior to Asahi, the stream of commerce doctrine was widely
applied by courts throughout the nation.3 7 The doctrine is well-
stated (and justified) in Friedenthal, Kane, and Miller's Horn-
book as follows:
If the defendant purposefully caters to a national market, dis-
tributing its product across the country through its own efforts
or the efforts of middlemen, a plaintiff still can constitutionally
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Bean Dredging Corp. v. Dredge Technology Corp., 744 F.2d 1081 (5th
Cir. 1984); Carson v. Park Indus., Inc., 717 F.2d 1120, 1126 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1024 (1984); Hedrick v. Daiko Shaji Co., 715 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1983);
Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distrib. Pty. Lt., 647 F.2d 200, 203
(D.C. Cir. 1981); Poyner v. Erma Werke GMBH, 618 F.2d 1186, 1190-91 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980); Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458
P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961); von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudi-
cate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1168-72 (1966); J. FRIEDENTHAL, M.
KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE, 136 (1985);4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 259-61 (1969); Currie, The Growth of the Long-Arm: Eight
Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. LAW F. 533, 546-60; Note, North
Carolina Adopts the Stream of Commerce Theory of Jurisdiction: A Step in the Right
Direction, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 737 (1984).
19881
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assert jurisdiction over that defendant in virtually any state
where the product malfunctions. The assertion of jurisdiction
is fair because the national or international manufacturer re-
ceives economic benefit from a countrywide market and rea-
sonably should expect to be subject to suit in any state.3"
In effect, by finding insufficient contacts under the stream
of commerce doctrine in Asahi, O'Connor has defined that for-
merly sound theory out of existence. O'Connor's view requires
that the defendant control the flow of its products and actually
choose where they will go. This is precisely the type of require-
ment that the stream of commerce doctrine exists to overcome.
A defendant who personally sends his product to California, or
contracts with someone else to send it to California, does not use
the stream of commerce; he sells in California. It is fair to say
that if Asahi did not qualify under the stream of commerce doc-
trine, no one ever will.39 Asahi sold 1.35 million valve assemblies
to Cheng Shin for worldwide distribution during the period rele-
vant to this suit, while also selling assemblies to other manufac-
turers for similar distribution. If O'Connor's view is accepted,
the doctrine is dead, awaiting only burial. That such a view
could garner even one justice's support, let alone four, suggests a
complete lack of common ground between the objectives gov-
erning their analysis, and those previously thought to be univer-
sally accepted.
Whereas O'Connor goes to some lengths to stress her literal
use of the term "purposeful direction," Justice Stevens treats
this purposefulness as a requirement which may be met by im-
plied purposefulness rather than actual purposefulness.
"Whether or not ...conduct rises to the level of purposeful
availment [depends on] the volume, the value, and the hazard-
38. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 136 (1985).
39. O'Connor's opinion did not accept the common understanding of the stream of
commerce doctrine. O'Connor's standard for applying the doctrine is that a defendant
must purposefully direct its actions toward the particular forum state for that state to
assert jurisdiction. 107 S. Ct. at 1033. The placement of a product into the open stream
of commerce, in her view, does not constitute a purposefully directed act. Nor does the
defendant's awareness that his product is being sold by others in the forum state satisfy
her standard. The situation that might conceivably qualify under her view would be one
in which a defendant makes a product uniquely designed for use in the forum state. 107
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ous character"4 of the items sold. Stevens, then, employed a le-
gal fiction-implied purposefulness-which serves largely to
complicate and obscure the underlying analysis.41
Brennan's concurrence relied on the fact that Asahi's regu-
lar and extensive sales were made with knowledge of Cheng
Shin's American and worldwide sales. Quoting from World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,4 he argued:
[I]f the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor...
is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts
of the manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or indi-
rectly, the market for its product in other states ... [t]he fo-
rum state does not exceed its powers under the Due Process
Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that
delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the ex-
pectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the fo-
rum state.43
Even Brennan, however, did not go far enough. A manufac-
turer should be subject to jurisdiction under the stream of com-
merce doctrine even absent actual awareness of the product's fi-
nal market. No matter how many middlemen exist between a
manufacturer's placement of his product into the stream of com-
merce and the arrival of the final product in a state, the manu-
facturer still benefits financially from the sale of the product,
and exposes the public to the product's risks. O'Connor's argu-
ment that Asahi did not purposely avail itself of the California
market blithely ignores economic reality. She looked only at the
narrowest facts to decide against personal jurisdiction:
[Asahi] has no office, agents, employees, or property in Califor-
40. Id. at 1038 (Stevens, J., concurring).
41. This Article has assumed that Stevens was in a middle-ground position between
Brennan and O'Connor, but at no point does he actually clarify whether his analysis
would require knowledge. Thus it is actually possible that Stevens took an approach
using much of O'Connor's wording, but which would produce results more generous to a
state's power to exercise jurisdiction than Brennan's view.
42. 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980). It is worth noting that Justice Brennan dissented in
World-Wide because he did not feel that case went far enough. Whether Brennan
changed his views on World-Wide or whether he was simply using it as a standard be-
yond which restriction on jurisdiction should not go is now unclear. If the latter case is
true, then Brennan may well agree with the view expressed in this Article that even
knowledge need not be required under the stream of commerce analysis.
43. 107 S. Ct. at 1037 (emphasis added).
1988] 883
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nia. It does not advertise or otherwise solicit business in Cali-
fornia. It did not create, control, or employ the distribution
system that brought its valves to California. . . . There is no
evidence that Asahi designed its product in anticipation of
sales in California.
44
Asahi did none of these things, but it did do a brisk and profita-
ble business in California and, in doing so, it injured two people.
In my view, World-Wide carved out a narrow exception for an
isolated case when the consumer moved the product to a place
that was foreseeable only in the sense that portable or mobile
items can be moved anywhere. 45 The general rule, however, is, or
should be, that a manufacturer who makes a product and
thereby exposes the populace of a state to harm from the prod-
uct, should be required to defend in that state when damage oc-
curs there. It is a basic function of a state to provide compensa-
tion for persons injured within its boundaries, and this power
should be curtailed only when compelling reasons require the
Court to do so. Absent unusual considerations, a manufacturer
who readily accepts the benefits of the sale of his product must
also shoulder the responsibility of litigation wherever he permits
his product to be marketed.
There seems to be no reason to place a premium on control,
as O'Connor did. Her analysis will only produce more companies
doing business through "independent" middlemen. Her reason-
ing would routinely expose consumers to harm from faulty prod-
ucts with significant impairment of the right to seek damages.
Protection is stripped away from injured consumers while manu-
facturers, shorn of responsibility for their products, participate
in chains of distribution that stretch across continents and na-
tions. It is difficult to imagine how manufacturers of any compo-
nent part could be subjected to jurisdiction in places other than
of their own choosing under O'Connor's reasoning since such
companies rarely market their products directly.
46
44. Id. at 1033.
45. I should indicate my view that World-Wide was itself incorrectly decided. If a
rational person were constructing rules of interstate venue, the obvious place to pick
would be the situs of the harm. To the extent the Court's analysis has brought it to a
point where it finds itself rejecting such a situs, it seems more appropriate to question
the analysis than the situs.
46. If O'Connor's analysis became the rule, even manufacturers of the final product
could readily escape jurisdiction by the simple expedient of employing middlemen and
[Vol. 39
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Asahi benefits from every sale of a tube using its valve. De-
pending on whether one analyzes the question under LIFO or
FIFO accounting procedures,47 Asahi benefits because the ulti-
mate sale by Cheng Shin is the reason Asahi had the earlier sale,
or it will be the reason Asahi will have its next sale. Either way,
Asahi is not a disinterested spectator. If Cheng Shin has a good
year, Asahi has a good year.
For much the same reasons, whether Asahi knew where
Cheng Shin sold its products seems immaterial. The economic
and practical realities are the same regardless of whether some-
one from Asahi happens to ask where the product is going. The
defendant's objection only becomes strong enough to overcome
the presumption of jurisdiction at the place of injury or sale
when either the defendant has affirmatively attempted to avoid
having his product enter a state,48 or when a product's entrance
into a state was so fortuitous that no one could reasonably have
thought to take steps to prevent the product from entering the
state.
49
An analogy to criminal law may be useful in clarifying this
dissenting view. O'Connor's view may be compared to a rule of
law that would make a party guilty of a crime only if he directs
his weapon at a particular person. Under this analogy, Brennan's
view would find that a crime has been committed even if you
shoot at no one in particular, but in a given direction, knowing
not controlling their market selection.
47. FIFO is an accounting term for "first in-first out"; LIFO is an accounting term
for "last in-first out." LIFO and FIFO are accounting techniques used to assess the prof-
itability of a particular sale. The price received for the object sold must be compared to
the cost of the object sold. Where a company has ongoing sales and an inventory pool,
the FIFO and LIFO accounting techniques represent the two major conceptual ap-
proaches to the evaluation of the cost of the goods sold. See generally, E. M. FARIS,
ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS, 134-40 (3rd ed. 1975); S. GUNTER, ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS
1987, 95-98 (1987).
48. See, e.g., Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 97 (1978) (appellee, seeking to
avoid California's high child support payments, had his ex-wife fly to New York to sign a
contract to ensure that he would have no contact with California). A company is free to
decline to sell to someone who is expected to resell in a particular state, or who will not
promise not to resell in that state. If, in such a situation, the middleman should then sell
in that state in violation of the manufacturer's rights or expectations, or if the product
should otherwise find its way to the state, the manufacturer would be exempt from juris-
diction under World-Wide.
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people are there. This Article contends that one cannot shoot
without first looking to see that people are not going to be hit.
In jurisdictional terms, there is little difference between a de-
fendant who knows his product is going to be sold in California
and one who does not care to ask. Holding a party liable only if
he has knowledge that his product will reach the forum state
simply places a premium on ignorance.
V. THE USE OF Two-STEP ANALYSIS
The portion of Justice O'Connor's opinion that received the
genuine endorsement of the Court is Part II-B.50 In this segment
of the opinion, O'Connor asserted that, minimum contacts not-
withstanding, other considerations would render adjudication in
California unwise or unfair. Thus, in Asahi the jurisdictional
analysis was clearly divided into two separate steps: step one,
"are there sufficient contacts?" and step two, "would litigation
in the chosen forum be fair?"
Minimum contacts analysis, which was originally a one-step
process, has been gradually bifurcated into a two-step inquiry.
In deciding personal jurisdiction questions, courts originally
looked for contacts that were sufficient to render the assertion of
jurisdiction fair.5 1 Thus, the question of fairness was the ques-
tion of the sufficiency of the contacts. Gradually, a separation
into the twin concerns of "sufficiency of contacts" and "fairness"
crept into some lower court decisions.2  This two-step analysis
50. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 326 316-21 (1945).
The same wording was used in Part III of the O'Connor opinion, which clumsily ex-
pressed the basis for the Asahi Court's conclusion. See supra note 31.
52. See, e.g., Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80
Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969). In Buckeye, among other factors considered in the jurisdictional
analysis, the California Supreme Court thought it was significant that the majority of
witnesses were in California. See also Haile v. Henderson Nat'l Bank, 657 F.2d 816, 828
(6th Cir. 1981) (Keith, J., dissenting); Aaron Feror & Sons Co. v. Atlas Scrap Iron, 558
F.2d '150, 453 (8th Cir. 1977); Caesar's World, Inc. v. Spencer Foods, Inc., 498 F.2d 1176,
1180 (8th Cir. 1974); Humble v. Toyota Motor Co., 578 F. Supp 530, 532 (N.D. Iowa),
aff'd, 727 F.2d 709 (8th Cir. 1982); Controlled Metals, Inc. v. Non Ferrous Int'l Corp.,
410 F. Supp. 339, 342-43 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp.,
372 F. Supp. 191, 203-05 (1974); Oliver v. American Motors Corp., 70 Wash. 2d 875, 882-
83, 425 P.2d 647, 652 (1967); Tyee Constr. Co. v. Dulien Steel Prod., Inc., 62 Wash. 2d
106, 115, 381 P.2d 245, 251 (1963); Nixon v. Cohn, 62 Wash. 2d 987, 999, 385 P.2d 305,
312 (1963); Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court, 347 P.2d 1, 3-4, 1 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3-4
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may have even become an unarticulated or unexplained factor in
a handful of Supreme Court cases as well. It probably played a
silent role in Hanson v. Denckla,53 and was at least obliquely
and unknowingly mentioned in McGee v. International Life In-
surance Co.54 and Kulko v. Superior Court.5 5 The only Supreme
Court decisions to discuss explicitly the two-step analysis, how-
ever, were the companion cases of Keeton u. Hustler" and Cal-
der v. Jones,57 which flatly and persuasively rejected the sugges-
tion. In Hustler, a defamation suit was filed in New Hampshire,
the only jurisdiction in the nation in which the statute of limita-
tions had not run.58 Neither plaintiff nor defendant were from
New Hampshire. The Court, in reversing the decision below,
held that the defendant's regular, albeit minor, circulation of its
magazines in the forum state amounted to sufficient contacts to
support the assertion of New Hampshire jurisdiction. Rehnquist,
who delivered the opinion (and yet joined in all parts of
O'Connor's opinion in Asahi) explicitly posed the test for juris-
diction as an integrated, one-step, contacts-based process: "The
contacts between respondent and New Hampshire must be such
(1959); Henry R. Jahn & Son v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855, 860, 323 P.2d 437, 442
(1958).
53. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). In Hanson a woman executed a trust in Delaware that was
valid in that state, but not in Florida, where she later relocated. In addition, she had the
trust drafted as a will that would have been valid in most jurisdictions, but Florida
found it invalid because it had been witnessed by only two persons instead of three, as
required by Florida law. Thus, Florida proposed to apply its law to the transaction in a
way that was most likely viewed as unreasonable and offensive to the Court's notions of
interstate federalism. Hanson is virtually impossible to distinguish from McGee in terms
of a simple enumeration of contacts. Some feel that the only way to explain Hanson is to
discern that the Court applied a stricter jurisdictional calculus with a view of the unfair-
ness of the application of Florida law. See, e.g., Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp.,
100 Ariz. 251, 256, 413 P.2d 732, 735 (1966); J. LANDERS & J. MARTIN, CIVIL PROCEDURE
78 (1981); c.f. Sobeloff, Jurisdiction of State Courts Over Non-Residents in Our Federal
System, 43 CORNELL L. Q. 196 (1957).
54. 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (stressing the forum state's interest).
55. 436 U.S. 84 (1978). Kulko included a number of noncontacts-based factors. For
example, the Court apparently discounted some very important contacts in California,
the forum state, because the parties were in that state due to circumstances related to
the husband's military service on behalf of his country. Id. at 86-87, 90, 93. Further,
Kulko discounted the significance of the husband's having sent the children to California
voluntarily because the Court wanted to encourage such cooperative behavior among di-
vorced parents. Id. at 94.
56. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
57. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
58. Hustler, 465 U.S. at 773, 778.
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that it is 'fair' to compel respondent to defend. . .. ,,5 Rehn-
quist, speaking for a unanimous Court,60 specifically rejected the
reasoning of the lower court which, while conceding the neces-
sary level of contacts, separately considered the element of
fairness:
The Court of Appeals also thought that there was an ele-
ment of due process "unfairness" arising from the fact that the
statutes of limitations in every jurisdiction except New Hamp-
shire had run on the plaintiff's claim in this case. Strictly
speaking, however, any potential unfairness in applying New
Hampshire's statute of limitations to all aspects of this nation-
wide suit has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court to
adjudicate the claims. . . . [A]nd we do not think that such
choice of law concerns should complicate or distort the juris-
dictional inquiry.6'
Further, Rehnquist criticized the court of appeals' analysis re-
garding the first amendment and the forum state's lack of inter-
est in the litigation as unnecessary considerations.6 2 In view of
Asahi, Chief Justice Rehnquist might as well have stayed home
that day.
The Court's pronouncements in Hustler and Calder plainly
purport to eliminate the lower courts' trend toward employing
nebulous and confusing considerations about separate fairness
issues in jurisdictional analysis. Rehnquist exposed the weakness
of adding a second step to further complicate what is already a
necessarily imprecise inquiry63 in the first step.
Hustler's eradication of the step two analysis is correct at
both a practical and theoretical level. Pragmatically, the con-
tacts analysis is already extremely imprecise. It is difficult to say
how many contacts constitute a sufficient nexus with the forum
to satisfy the basic minimum contacts inquiry.6 4 If a second step,
59. Id. at 775 (emphasis added).
60. Justice Brennan concurred. Id. at 782. Justice Rehnquist's opinion was joined by
all of the remaining justices. In Calder, Justice Rehnquist wrote on behalf of the entire
Court.
61. Id. at 778 (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 776, 779, 780 n.12; see also Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790-1 (1984)
(rejecting suggestion that First Amendment concerns enter into the jurisdictional
analysis).
63. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 790.
64. In addition, the various factors that might be susceptible to control through the
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an even more amorphous fairness analysis, is to take place, there
are many possible evaluative factors that would have to be con-
sidered, including public policy considerations, 5 choice of law
abuse,"' the degree to which the forum state is really interested
in the litigation, 7 actual inconvenience of defending in a partic-
ular location for a particular defendant,68 and convenience of
witnesses.6 9 A potential morass of elements and an equally dis-
concerting lack of a meaningful basis by which to weigh their
effects would be involved in this second step. As a practical mat-
ter, an attorney simply would be unable to advise a client about
whether his claim would meet the jurisdictional requirements in
any possible forum, and trial judges would be unable to rule
with any degree of confidence on jurisdictional questions. The
flexibility to consider a large number of factors may be desira-
ble, but certainty also has value to the law. Sometimes it helps
step two analysis are not likely to be controlled effectively through jurisdictional analysis
in any event. Only in the most borderline cases will adjustments in the jurisdictional
calculus be possible. For instance, if one views Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958)
(see supra note 53 and accompanying text) as an example of control of choice of law
abuse, the effectiveness of that control through modification of the jurisdictional calculus
depends entirely on the precise contacts present in that case. Consider the effect on
Hanson if the Delaware trustee, fortuitously, happened to own a vacation home in Flor-
ida, or had a similar connection with the state that would obviously increase his contacts.
The ability to curtail choice of law abuse would be lost. As an even more clear-cut exam-
ple, if the defendant is a large national corporation doing business in all fifty states,
control of choice of law abuse would be entirely nonexistent. The corporation could be
sued in every state, regardless of the consequences. Step two shifts, but does not eradi-
cate, the contacts-based calculus. Therefore, it must be conceded that using jurisdiction
to control extraneous factors would only work sporadically, in the occasional borderline
case.
65. See, e.g., Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1978); New York Times v.
Connor, 365 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1966) (overruled in Hustler and Calder); Kailieha v.
Hayes, 56 Haw. 306, 311-13, 536 P.2d 568, 572 (1975).
66. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); Ratliff v. Cooper Labora-
tories, Inc. 444 F.2d 745, 747 (4th Cir. 1971) (overruled in Hustler).
67. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); Buckeye
Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 62, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 118
(1969).
68. Philips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 808 (1985); Kailieha v. Hayes, 56
Haw. 306, 311-13, 536 P.2d 568, 572 (1975).
69. Buckeye Boiler, 71 Cal. 2d at 903, 458 P.2d at 67, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 123. Addi-
tional concerns might include the international considerations discussed in Asahi and
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1983), and the discus-
sions of commercial practicality found in World-wide and Helicopteros. The interna-
tional concerns reflected in Asahi and Helicopteros should not be considered in any
event. See infra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
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to have, if not a rule, at least a finite and manageable set of
considerations. Under a two-step analysis, courts must inevita-
bly turn to deciding jurisdictional questions for completely un-
known reasons and without plausible explanations. This confu-
sion is precisely what Justice Black predicted in International
Shoe70 when he warned that the amorphous minimum contacts
analysis, and the natural law concept of due process on which it
was based, would prove impossible to apply.
The use of a second, fairness step in jurisdictional analysis
is also subject to attack at a theoretical level. If having sufficient
contacts does not determine the fairness of the forum state's as-
sertion of jurisdiction, then the relevance of contacts-based anal-
ysis, itself, is open to question. The Supreme Court is limited in
reviewing jurisdictional matters to those questions falling under
the ambit of due process considerations. To concede that con-
tacts do not define fairness is to concede that the Court has, at
all times since International Shoe, really been creating some-
thing more akin to a federal common law of interstate venue,
rather than a due process-based restriction on jurisdiction. 1
Yet, having picked up the sword of fairness and having
placed it in the arsenal of due process, the Court seems to have
forgotten that the guarantee of due process assures only a basic
type of fairness that cannot be extended to create a guarantee
that every case will be decided correctly. If a party wins at trial
by persuading the trier of fact with dishonest testimony, the re-
sulting verdict will be unfair. Few would claim, however, that
the Supreme Court should review the testimony de novo. The
Court's error, then, has been to extend due process protection to
every unfairness regardless of whether existing doctrines of fo-
rum non conveniens should have been allowed to govern. Indeed,
Justice Black persuasively argued that the minimum contacts
70. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
71. This explanation of the Court's minimum contacts analysis appears more plausi-
ble in any event. Among other things, it would resolve the present confusion in attempt-
ing to apply personal jurisdictional analysis to the federal courts and to appeals from the
state courts to the United States Supreme Court which, obviously, sits only in Washing-
ton, D.C. In addition, if a due process-based right to object to a certain degree of defend-
ant inconvenience or geographic movement exists, state lines are an awkward means of
determining its application. Under present analysis, requiring a Delaware resident to
travel a short distance to nearby Pennsylvania violates due process, while a person from
east Texas may freely be required to travel to the western portion of that state because
the purportedly constitutional concern is not invoked until state lines are crossed.
[Vol. 39
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analysis was an extension into areas best left for the states. His
view may overlook the need for some control over relations be-
tween the states in a federal system. The minimum contacts
analysis chosen by the Court, however, purports to be based on
due process considerations, and is poorly suited to interstate
federalism concerns in any event.
The newly added step two seems even less suited to either
function. The true essence of the second step, as displayed in
Asahi, appears to be a judgment of the wisdom, rather than the
fairness, of entertaining the litigation in the chosen forum.72
One must ask whether an inquiry based on wisdom is appropri-
ate for constitutional adjudication. Even those who might feel
that the Court reached a laudable outcome in Asahi must con-
sider whether it did so with regard to questions about which the
California courts should be the last to speak. Constitutionalizing
forum non conveniens would be a novel, far reaching, and un-
warranted extension of federal power into one of the few re-
maining areas of state authority.
VI. INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Assuming, arguendo, that it is proper for the Court to em-
ploy a second step in the jurisdictional analysis, it does not ap-
pear that the step two analysis actually employed in Asahi was
appropriate. The Court focused on two specific factors that it
saw as rendering jurisdiction either unfair or unwise. First, the
Court expressed a special concern over the effect of its jurisdic-
tional decisions in international relations .7  This concern ap-
pears to have had its origin in an obscure and, at the time, un-
published law review article. 4 Surprise at the Court's reliance
on such a piece and at Rehnquist's willingness to join the opin-
ion despite his statements in Hustler may be abated by observ-
ing that the author had been Rehnquist's law clerk just a few
72. Examples of the wisdom-based analysis would include concerns about the effect
of personal jurisdiction decisions on the conduct of foreign affairs and the forum state's
lack of interest in the litigation. On the other hand, some of the concerns reflected in
step two, such as the concern about choice of law abuse, are relevant to interstate
federalism.
73. 676 107 S. Ct. at 1034-35.
74. Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 GA. J.
INT'L & ComP. L. 1-44 (1987).
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years earlier.7 5
Although the Court identified no actual foreign relations
problems presented by Asahi, the Court seemed to suggest that
a special deference to aliens weighs in the jurisdictional calculus
every time the defendant is from another country: "The unique
burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign
legal system should have significant weight in assessing the rea-
sonableness of stretching the long arm of personal jurisdiction
over national borders. '76 These companies, however, have cho-
sen to do business in the United States, or even, in Asahi's case,
throughout the world. Certainly an American company that does
business in Taiwan or Saudi Arabia risks the same difficulties.
For this reason, some choose not to do such business. The Court
appears to have dramatically increased the probability that a
foreign company can do business in the United States (indi-
rectly, at least) and entirely escape liability for any harm caused
by its products.
77
Whatever the wisdom of making such concessions to foreign
nationals, it is clear that the President, Congress, or both may
take international factors into account in drafting treaties, exec-
utive agreements, and legislation pursuant to their foreign af-
fairs powers.7 1 The Court, however, does not share such power.
The judiciary is the only branch of government not given a for-
eign affairs role by the Constitution. 9 Other nations, at present,
75. See ASSOCIATION OF Am. LAW SCHOOLS, DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS, 1986-87
(1986) 201. (A slight discrepancy exists between the middle initial and rank of Professor
Born as identified in the Directory and that shown on the article. A telephone interview
with Professor Born on October 16, 1987 confirmed the accuracy of the information re-
lated here in the text.).
76. 107 S. Ct. at 1034.
77. Oddly enough, giving this advantage to foreign companies would place them in
an unfairly favorable position to compete in the American economy vis-a-vis American
companies. Thus, the Court appears to be conducting its "foreign policy" in a direction
completely at odds with the avowed "level playing field" objective presently advocated
by the Executive and the Legislature.
78. Only the President and the Legislature have authority to negotiate. See U. S.
CONST art. II, §2, cl. 2; id. art. I, §8, cl. 3; Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 414 (1920);
HENKIN, PUGH, SCHACHTER & SMITH, INTERNATIONAL LAW 143-46 (1980).
79. Regarding the power to conduct foreign affairs, see U. S. CONST. art. I, §2, cl. 2
(President and Senate) (commerce with foreign nations); id. art. I, §8, cl. 4 (Congress)
(naturalization); id. art. I, §8, cl. 5 (Congress) (regulation of value of foreign coin); id. art.
1, §8, cl. 10 (Congress) (definition and punishment of piracy, crime at sea, and offenses
against the law of nations); id. art I, §8, cl. 12 (Congress) (raising and supporting armies);
id. art. I, §8, cl. 13 (Congress) (providing and maintaining a navy); id. art. I, §8, cl. 14
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do not typically give such special consideration to our citizens in
their adjudicatory systems, and it is inappropriate for us to uni-
laterally bestow such a benefit on them. The President and Con-
gress usually negotiate such privileges, obtaining parallel or
other concessions in return. The Court in Asahi appears to have
given away the store for free.
VII. THE EFFECT OF PARTIAL SETTLEMENTS: JURISDICTION BY
HINDSIGHT
The second factor in the Court's step two analysis is even
more troubling. Apparently, the most significant reason for de-
clining jurisdiction was that the settlement of the primary case
left only an indemnification claim between the foreign tire man-
ufacturer and the foreign valve supplier.80 One must keep in
mind that the original action was a personal injury action
brought by a Californian injured in California by a product pur-
chased in California. Nonetheless, the indemnification action
was said by the Court to be one in which California had no legit-
imate interest."" One is therefore left to wonder if the outcome
of the case would have been the same if the principal case had
not settled. If the failure to settle would have changed the out-
come-as I am almost certain it would-the Court has accom-
plished very little in deciding Asahi. The opinion tells us noth-
ing more than the outcome of an especially peculiar set of facts.
More importantly, however, jurisdiction always attaches, or
fails to attach, at the time of filing. 2 At least that was the rule
(Congress) (rules for government and armed forces); id. art. I, §8, cl. 15 (Congress) (re-
pelling invasions). Note that no clause refers to the judiciary. There is a well-developed
practice by which the courts follow the lead of the Executive in all matters involving
foreign affairs, rather than risking the inconsistency that would occur if the courts made
independent judgments. See, e.g., First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406
U.S. 759, 760-70 (Rehnquist, J.), 773-76 (Powell, J., concurring) (1971).
80. 107 S. Ct. at 1029-30.
81. Id. at 1034.
82. See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975); Cheng Fan Kwok v. Immigration &
Naturalization Service, 392 U.S. 206 (1968); Metlakatla Indian Community, Annette Is-
land Reserve v. Egan, 363 U.S. 555 (1960); Thompson, Trustee v. Magnolia Petroleum
Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940); Harris v. Avery Brundage Co., 305 U.S. 160 (1938); United
states v. Freights, Etc. of S. S. Mount Shasta, 274 U.S. 466 (1927); Blamberg Bros. v.
United States, 260 U.S. 452 (1923); North Pac. Steamship Co. v. Soley, 257 U.S. 216, 217
(1921) ("The circumstances existing at the time of filing the bill of complaint are deter-
minative of jurisdiction.") (citing Way v. Clay, 140 F. 352 (S.D. W. Va. 1904)); Sheffield
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prior to Asahi. The Court did not discuss the question of over-
ruling such a longstanding rule and, therefore, as unlikely as it
seems that such a point would be overlooked, I must assume
that it was.
Although this basic rule was not expressly overruled, it was
clearly ignored by the Asahi Court's analysis of jurisdiction by
hindsight. The Court's conclusion regarding the inappropriate-
ness of jurisdiction improperly focused solely on the one remain-
ing claim whose lone existence could only be known after the
fact. The considerations O'Connor enumerated for evaluating
the reasonableness of jurisdiction-e.g., the burden on the de-
fendant and the interests of the forum state-would be properly
applied, if at all, at the time of filing, when the other claims
were still pending. If the vestiges that remained years afterward
had been filed alone, the California courts might well have dis-
missed Asahi under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Thus,
it is irrelevant that the jurisdictional interests of the plaintiff
were slight after the settlement, and it was therefore unneces-
sary for Cheng Shin to "demonstrate that it is more convenient
for it to litigate its indemnification claim against Asahi in Cali-
fornia rather than Taiwan or Japan.
'8 3
Such a practice of shifting jurisdiction, if Asahi is seen as
embracing a new practice of redetermining jurisdiction as events
change, is inherently problematic. We must consider the policy
implications of permitting the uncertainty that would result if
events that might occur years after filing could divest a court of
jurisdiction that was proper at the outset. Statutes of limitations
present one example of the problems that might be created.
These limitations might run out in the interim, and it might not
be possible to re-sue in the newly appropriate forum.84 Various
& Birmingham Coal, Iron and Ry. Co. v. Gordon, 151 U.S. 285 (1894); Horizon
Creditcorp v. Oil Screw "Innovation I", 730 F.2d 1389 (11th Cir. 1984); Boble v. Marsh,
684 F.2d 12 (D.C. Cir. 1982); 1 J, MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.91[3] (1987).
83. 107 S. Ct. at 1034.
84. In a minority of jurisdictions, the statute of limitations is not tolled by the filing
of a lawsuit in another jurisdiction that later turns out to be improper. Compare Nichols
v. Canoga Indus., 83 Cal. App. 3d 956, 962-64, 148 Cal. Rptr. 459 463-64 (1978) (a litigant
who timely files an action in the wrong forum and thereby gives notice of its pendency to
his adversary may be relieved from the statute of limitations under the rule of equitable
tolling) with Baldwin v. Happy Herman's, Inc., 122 Ga. App. 520, 520, 177 S.E.2d 814,
815 (1970) ("A void judgment is an absolute nullity and it does not prevent the running
of the statute."). Research materials available do not permit an examination of the law
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other reliance-based concerns might arise. Parties would never
know if the court in which they are proceeding has jurisdiction.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Asahi reflects a profoundly divided Court lacking a clear
sense of which factors should govern decisions on personal juris-
diction. Asahi underscores the fact that the minimum contacts
calculus has always been and most certainly is a completely ad
hoc jurisprudence. For this reason, this Article began with the
discussion of Justice Black's prophetic concurrence in Interna-
tional Shoe, which essentially predicted that the amorphous
minimum contacts analysis created in that case turned entirely
on an unknown and unknowable sense of "natural justice" and
would prove impossible to apply.
The most significant example of this lack of an accepted
means of analyzing minimum contacts questions is found in the
divergent views expressed in Asahi with regard to the stream of
commerce analysis. The stream of commerce doctrine is an emi-
nently sound one, and none of the Asahi opinions applies it as
generously as this Article has suggested. The most troubling as-
pect of Asahi is the realization that four justices subscribe to the
view set forth in O'Connor's opinion, which would entirely elimi-
nate this valuable doctrine. While this view does not account for
the majority of the Court, it is surprising that such a view would
find any support at all. No reason for eliminating the stream of
commerce doctrine is ever spelled out in O'Connor's opinion.
In any view, the stream of commerce doctrine grows out of
the inherent power of a state to afford protection to those in-
jured within its borders. While this power may be limited in
cases in which a product arrives in the forum state through ut-
terly fortuitous or freakish circumstances, a defendant who will-
ingly places his product into the stream of commerce ought to be
required to appear and defend that product wherever it is ulti-
mately sold by those whose resale of the manufacturer's product
enriches him.
of Taiwan and Japan in this regard. Notably, the Court did not consider whether the
courts of Taiwan or Japan would still be available for refiling a lawsuit. Under current
forum non conveniens doctrine, a more preferable forum must be available before a dis-
missal will be entered.
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Another troubling aspect of the Asahi decision is the true
majority's apparent reliance on the two-step analysis. If Asahi is
to be taken at its word, the Supreme Court appears to be en-
dorsing the idea that the fairness question and the contacts in-
quiry are distinct and unrelated steps in deciding personal juris-
diction questions. Indeed, in Asahi, these two steps produce
opposite results. In prior decisions, such as Keeton v. Hustler,
the Court had indicated that the only question to be answered
was whether sufficient contacts existed; the existence of suffi-
cient contacts, itself, rendered the assertion jurisdiction fair. On
both practical and theoretical grounds, this Article has argued
that Hustler took the wiser course. Indeed, if either Asahi or
Hustler had to be selected as the more appropriate case for ap-
plying step two's special policy considerations, clearly Hustler's
First Amendment ramifications would seem more important
than Asahi's concerns related to forum non conveniens.
Turning to the step two or fairness discussion found in
Asahi, on which that decision stands or falls, the Court's reli-
ance on international and forum non conveniens concerns seems
misplaced. International concerns are not properly within the
province of the Court, and would be better left to diplomatic
negotiation. Forum non conveniens concerns are not, and ought
not be, of constitutional magnitude. Further, jurisdictional deci-
sions should not be based upon events occurring subsequent to
the filing of the lawsuit.
The peculiar fact in Asahi that all of the principal claims
had settled seems also to be the dispositive fact. Thus, once
again, the Court appears to have rendered a major personal ju-
risdiction decision that has achieved little more than identifying
the "correct" outcome of one unusual set of facts. Beyond its
lack of guidance for future cases, Asahi is flawed because it mis-
decides the facts actually before the Court, and it fails to display
any consensus on the Court as to the underlying analysis by
which such decisions are to be made. Thus, Asahi signals the
beginning of a dark day in the history of personal jurisdiction.
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